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One of the most powerful theorems in the literature on international taxation
and capital allocation is that residence based taxation is superior to source based
taxation. As a consequence, models analysing optimal tax policy strategies under
source based tax competition usually assume that residence based taxes are not
available. However, most of these models are based on the implicit assumption that
investment takes the form of green￿eld investment. This neglects that a large part
of international capital ￿ ows takes the form of mergers and acquisitions (M&A).
Since recent contributions claim that taking into account M&A investment does
lead to substantial changes in the e¢ ciency properties of taxation, see e.g. Desai &
Hines (2004) and Becker & Fuest (2008, forthcoming), it is important to investigate
the role of residence based taxation in a model where investment takes the form
of M&A.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a simple model which may serve as
an equivalent to the standard framework for tax competition based on green￿eld
investment, i.e. the reallocation of real capital instead of ownership. We consider
a world with two countries, where domestic investors may either acquire existing
￿rms at home and abroad or buy bonds in the international credit market. M&A
investment is driven by synergies. In this framework, we explore the impact of
source and residence based capital income taxes.
A ￿rst important ￿nding of our analysis is that international di⁄erences in res-
idence based taxation do not necessarily distort ownership patterns. Secondly, we
show that, if investment takes the form of M&A instead of green￿eld, the role of
source and residence based taxes for international tax competition and coordina-
tion is di⁄erent. In the baseline version of our model, the equilibrium corporate
tax levels emerging under tax competition are globally optimal if residence based
taxes on dividends are zero. There is no role for welfare enhancing tax coordina-
tion. In contrast, if residence based dividend taxes exist, tax competition yields
ine¢ ciently high level of corporate tax rates. The reason is that corporate taxation
a⁄ects neighbouring countries negatively through two di⁄erent channels. Corpor-
ate taxation of the host country reduces the tax base for residence based dividend
taxation, and corporate taxation of the residence country reduces the price the
1acquirer is willing to pay for the target ￿rm and, thus, decreases national income
of the host country. Residence based taxes on interest income and dividends have
complex external e⁄ects on the neighbouring countries￿welfare levels as well. These
e⁄ects are often ambiguous in sign and di⁄er substantially between the residence
and the host country. To deal with complexities arising due to the asymmetry of
tax competition equilibria in our model, we consider a speci￿c type of coordina-
tion experiment, which holds the relative tax burden on capital income in the two
countries constant. We show that, ￿rstly, a coordinated increase in residence based
taxes on interest income only redistributes income across jurisdictions; welfare ef-
fects only emerge if the preferences for public goods di⁄er. Secondly, dividend
taxes can be shown to be ine¢ ciently low if asymmetries between countries are
small. Our results stand in sharp contrast to the existing tax competition liter-
ature where tax competition with source based taxes usually leads to ine¢ cient
equilibria, and international tax coordination is required to implement the globally
optimal tax policy. In these models, the need for tax coordination is weakened and
may even vanish if residence based taxes are available.
For purpose of presentational clarity and comparison with the standard case
of green￿eld investment, we focus on the polar case where investment consists ex-
clusively of mergers and acquisitions. This implies the assumption that the stock
of real capital (the existing target ￿rms in our model) is constant and given. As
we show in Becker & Fuest (2008), considering green￿eld investment and M&A
simultaneously adds some complexity and requires a number of assumptions which
themselves limit the analytic scope with regard to tax e⁄ects on M&A. This is why
we choose to analyse the pure case of M&A only in this paper. The assumption
that there is no green￿eld investment drives the e¢ ciency result for the tax com-
petition equilibrium with source based taxes only. Given this, in terms of policy
conclusions, it would be inappropriate to question the potential for welfare enhan-
cing coordination of source based taxes. But our ￿ndings do challenge the view
that implementing residence based taxation may be a substitute for coordination.
In the literature, the issues of capital mobility and tax competition have been
studied intensively, see Fuest, Huber & Mintz (2005) for a recent survey. A broad
and still growing empirical literature on the impact of taxes on investment and
capital ￿ ows is surveyed by Devereux (2007). However, as noted above, these
2contributions usually assume that investment takes the form of green￿eld invest-
ment. The literature dealing with the impact of taxes on M&A is much smaller.
In an early contribution, Devereux (1990) points out that tax distortions to own-
ership may be important if capital productivity depends on ownership. Gordon &
Bovenberg (1996) as well as Fuest & Huber (2004) analyse tax policy strategies in
models where ￿rms may be sold to foreign investors. But they do not consider tax
competition or tax coordination. Desai & Hines (2004) argue that U.S. taxation
of foreign source income is likely to distort ownership patterns and to put U.S.
￿rms at a disadvantage when competing for foreign acquisitions. They propose to
exempt foreign source income from domestic taxation. In Becker & Fuest (forth-
coming), we analyse this argument and show that exemption is an appropriate
policy choice when ownership advantage is a public good within the ￿rm, but is
dominated in welfare terms by a cross-border cash-￿ ow tax system. In Becker and
Fuest (2008), we analyse tax competition in a model where M&A and green￿eld
investment are alternative modes of entry and show that the existence of M&A
investment intensi￿es tax competition. However, this analysis does not include
residence based taxes. Hau￿ er & Schulte (2007) consider tax incentives in a model
where M&A can take place within and across borders. They show that ownership
patterns are highly important for the welfare implications of tax policy choices.
From an empirical point of view, a number of contributions use the U.S. tax reform
in 1986 to explore the tax e⁄ects on M&A activity, see e.g. Auerbach & Slemrod
(1997).1 Swenson (1994) explores the idea that e⁄ective tax increases in the U.S.
may induce investors located in countries with foreign tax credit regimes to take
over U.S. ￿rms because the higher U.S. taxes may be credited against home coun-
try taxes, and ￿nds robust evidence supporting the hypothesis. In a recent paper,
Huizinga & Voget (forthcoming) study the empirical impact of international taxa-
tion schemes on M&A activity. Among other things, they ￿nd that investors from
tax credit countries are less likely to take over foreign ￿rms than investors from
countries where foreign pro￿ts are exempt from domestic taxation.
The remainder of the paper is set up as follows. In section 2, we present the
model and derive the main results. In section 3, we consider some extensions.
1See also Scholes & Wolfson (1990) and Collins, Kemsley & Shackelford (1995). Empirical
evidence on non-tax aspects of m&a activity is reported in Andrade, Mitchell & Sta⁄ord (2001).
3Section 4 discusses how the results relate to the literature and section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a world consisting of two countries, domestic and foreign. Each coun-
try is inhabited by a large number of households. For notational convenience, their
number per country is normalized to unity. Households live for two periods. The
utility of the representative domestic household is given by W = U(C1;C2)+H(G)
where C1 and C2 are consumption in the ￿rst and the second period, U (C1;C2) is
private utility and H(G) is utility from the provision of a public consumption good
G in period 2. For private utility, we assume U (C1;C2) = u(C1) + C2, where the
subutility function u(:) is strictly concave, with u0 > 0, u00 < 0. This utility func-
tion implies that income e⁄ects on ￿rst period consumption are zero, so that the
interest elasticity of savings is strictly positive.2 Accordingly, the utility function
of the foreign representative household is denoted by W ￿ = u￿(C￿
1)+C￿
2 +H￿(G￿).
The asterisk denotes the foreign country. In period 1, the domestic and the for-
eign household have a given endowment of E and E￿ units of a numeraire good,
respectively. Households may borrow or lend in the international capital market
at the interest rate r.3
In addition, the domestic household owns m existing and immobile ￿rms op-
erating in the domestic country. Without a change in ownership, the after tax
pro￿t earned by each domestic ￿rm in period 2 is given by "(1￿￿), where ￿ is the
domestic corporate income tax. Accordingly, the foreign household owns m￿ ￿rms
operating in the foreign country with an after-tax pro￿t of "￿(1 ￿ ￿￿), where ￿￿ is
the foreign corporate income tax.
The domestic household considers acquisitions of ￿rms in the domestic and in
the foreign country. To keep the model as simple as possible, we assume that the
representative household in the foreign household does not consider acquisitions.
2This assumption is not critical but simpli￿es the exposition.
3The seminal contributions by Richman (1963) and Feldstein & Hartman (1979) assume that
domestic households only invest in the multinational ￿rm￿ s equity. A portfolio capital market is
absent in these models. It is straightforward to show, however, that our results also hold if there
is no portfolio capital market in our model. A formal derivation is available from the authors
upon request.
4This asymmetry simpli￿es the exposition but also implies some complexities which
are discussed in sections 3.3 to 3.5.
If an existing domestic target ￿rm is acquired by the domestic household, the
change of ownership does not imply a relocation of real capital. But the ownership
change does have a real economic e⁄ect in the form of synergies. This synergy in-
creases the second period cash ￿ ow of the domestic target ￿rm by ￿. Equivalently,
if a foreign target ￿rm is acquired, second period cash ￿ ow increases by ￿￿. We
assume that each target ￿rm is characterized by a speci￿c synergy. More precisely,
we assume that each potential target ￿rm draws a synergy ￿ or ￿￿ from a uniform
distribution with support [￿￿;￿+] and [￿￿￿;￿￿+], respectively. The distribution
functions are denoted by ￿(￿) and ￿￿ (￿￿) and density functions are constant and
normalized to unity to ease notation. This synergy is the driving force for changes
in ownership in our model. The intuition behind this assumption is that the target
￿rm has some speci￿c asset (like customer relations, patents, brand names) which
becomes more valuable in the hands of the acquirer. The value of these speci￿c
assets di⁄ers across target ￿rms. Alternatively, one may think of adjustment costs
which arise after the acquisition of a target ￿rm. The lower the adjustment cost,
the higher the net synergy ￿ or ￿￿.
An important question which arises in this context is whether the overall num-
ber of acquisitions is limited by e.g. managerial capacity. In the baseline version of
our model, we assume that there is no limitation on the overall number of takeovers
which may take place. In section 3.6, we will consider the case where the num-
ber of feasible acquisitions is limited due to constrained management capacities or
convex transaction costs.
2.1 The market for M&A investment
The market for acquisitions works as follows. In period 1, all domestic and foreign
target ￿rms draw a synergy ￿ or ￿￿. Then, the domestic household bids for
target ￿rms. At this stage, the target ￿rm speci￿c synergy is common knowledge.
If the acquisition takes place, the acquirer has to pay the acquisition price P to
the vendor. In period 2, the acquirer receives the cash ￿ ow generated by the target
￿rm.
5For the tax treatment of acquisitions, we make the following assumptions. The
revenue from selling ￿rms is untaxed and investors cannot deduct acquisition costs
from the corporate tax base. This may be interpreted as a highly stylised way of
modelling acquisitions in the form of share deals, as opposed to asset deals. We thus
abstract from many complexities associated with the tax consequences of mergers
and acquisitions. These include e.g. capital gains taxes, the tax depreciation of
goodwill, the transfer of reserves, the use of loss carryforwards after ownership
changes and other speci￿c tax law provisions of the national tax systems, some of
which are surveyed in Huizinga & Voget (forthcoming). We also abstract from tax
planning considerations like e.g. the ￿nancing of foreign acquisitions with debt
issued in high tax jursidictions to bene￿t from interest deductions.4
The domestic household￿ s willingness to pay for a domestic target ￿rm j can
be determined as follows. If she acquires the ￿rm, she pays the acquisition price
P(￿j) in period 1. The payment of the acquisition price is ￿nanced by a reduction
of the household￿ s portfolio investment. The return on portfolio investment is
(1+r)(1￿t) , where t is a residence based tax on income from portfolio investment.
In period 2, she receives the after tax cash ￿ ow (" + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1￿￿), where ￿ is a
residence based tax on dividends. Given this, the highest aquisition price acquirers
are willing to pay is given by
(1 + r)(1 ￿ t)P(￿j) = (" + ￿j)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) (1)
Competition among acquirers will imply that the equilibrium price of acquisi-
tions will be given by P(￿j) as de￿ned by (1). Given this, under which circum-
stances will domestic vendors sell their ￿rms? If they sell, they may invest the
proceeds in the market for portfolio capital or use them for consumption in period
1. Thus a domestic vendor will sell if the purchase price is equal to or larger than
the present value of the second period income in case the ￿rm is not sold:
(1 + r)(1 ￿ t)P(￿j) ￿ "(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) (2)
Since P(￿j), as de￿ned in (1), is increasing in ￿j, we may conclude that all
4For a survey of evidence on international tax planning see Devereux (2007).
6domestic target ￿rms with ￿ ￿ ￿c will be acquired while ￿rms which o⁄er lower
synergies will remain in the hands of their original owners. It follows from (1)
and (2) that the cut-o⁄ level ￿c is simply given by ￿c = 0. This re￿ ects that the
domestic tax system is neutral for domestic acquisitions in this model.
In the case of foreign target ￿rms, the acquisition price is given by
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and the vendor is willing to sell if
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which implies ￿c￿ = ￿c￿(t￿;t;￿;￿
￿), with @￿￿c
@t￿ > 0, @￿￿c
@￿￿ < 0, @￿￿c
@t < 0 and
@￿￿c
@￿ > 0. Note that the source based corporate income tax ￿￿ does not a⁄ect the
number of acquisitions. The reason is that this tax is capitalized in the purchase
price - it always has to be paid, independent of who owns the ￿rm. For residence
based taxes, things are di⁄erent. An increase in t￿ reduces the number of border
crossing acquisitions because a lower return on portfolio investment increases the
value of target ￿rms in the hands of the initial foreign owners. The reason is that
these ￿rms o⁄er a return in period 2 which is not subject to the tax on portfolio
income. Put di⁄erently, an increase in this tax reduces the discount rate of foreign
owners. For the same reason, an increase in t increases border crossing acquisitions.
A higher residence based tax on dividend income in the foreign country ￿
￿ leads to
more acquisitions because the acquirers are not subject to this tax. Accordingly,
a higher domestic dividend tax ￿ reduces border crossing acquisitions.
Equation (5) allows to de￿ne conditions for ownership neutrality of the interna-
tional tax system. In the absence of taxes, (5) boils down to ￿c￿ = 0. Ownership
neutrality would require that this equation holds in the presence of taxes, too.
Source based taxes do not disturb ownership neutrality, as has been pointed out
7in the literature (Devereux, 1990). But interestingly, residence based taxes do
not necessarily distort ownership neutrality either. For instance, if each country
taxes dividends and interest income at the same rate, ownership neutrality prevails
even if the tax rates di⁄er across countries. The view that taxes on foreign source
dividends may violate ownership neutrality is based on the idea that an investor
from a country with high taxes will end up with a lower return on the acquisition
of a given ￿rm than an investor from a low tax country. But this neglects that the
price an investor is willing to pay will also depend on the tax burden on alternat-
ive investments. If the tax on intererest income is also higher, this may neutralise
the higher dividend tax, and no ownership distortions arise. We may state these
results as
Proposition 1 Ownership neutrality:
i) International di⁄erences in source based taxation do not distort ownership
allocation.
ii) Ownership neutrality is compatible with international di⁄erences in resid-
ence based capital income tax rates if 1￿￿￿
1￿￿ = 1￿t￿
1￿t .
Proof. The proof directly follows from equation (5).
2.2 The international credit market
How do changes in taxes and investment a⁄ect the international credit market?
Consider ￿rst the budget constraint of the domestic household. In the ￿rst period,
the household￿ s endowment E may be used for consumption, credit market invest-
ment S or for the ￿nancing of acquisitions. Expenditures for ￿nancing domestic
acquistions are
R ￿+
￿c P(￿)d￿, but these expenditures ￿ ow back to the domestic
household in the same period because the domestic household owns these ￿rms in













(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
(1 + r)(1 ￿ t)
d￿
￿ (6)
do not ￿ ow back to the domestic households and therefore have to be ￿nanced
8in addition. The budget constraint in period 1 is thus given by







In the second period, the household receives income from investment in the in-
ternational credit market and pro￿t distributions from domestic and international
M&A investment. The budget constraint in the second period can be written as



















Optimal choice of S implies u0(C1) = (1+r)(1￿t). The foreign household has


























￿ (1 ￿ ￿
￿)(1 ￿ ￿
￿) (10)
Optimal saving by the foreign household implies u￿0(C￿
1) = (1 + r)(1 ￿ t￿).
Equilibrium in the portfolio capital market requires that net lending equals net
borrowing which implies that net savings have to equal zero, S + S￿ = 0. The
two ￿rst order conditions for optimal savings and the credit market equilibrium
condition determine the equilibrium values of S, S￿and r, for given taxes and a
given pattern of domestic and foreign acquisitions. How do taxes a⁄ect the capital
market equilibrium? Consider ￿rst the e⁄ect of tax changes on the interest rate r.
Lemma The equilibrium interest rate r is increasing in t and t￿. Changes in the
number or the prices of foreign acquisitions do not a⁄ect the interest rate r.


























￿(1 + r)] (12)
















u￿00 < 0. This implies dr
dt > 0; dr






The ￿nding that a change in the expenditure of the domestic household on
foreign acquisitions does not a⁄ect the interest rate can be explained as follows.
Consider an increase in the number of foreign acquisitions. This implies that the
revenue from selling ￿rms accruing to the foreign household in the ￿rst period in-
creases. The foreign household invests this additional cash ￿ ow in the international
credit market because, at a given interest rate, it is optimal to hold ￿rst period
consumption constant. The domestic household, in contrast, needs additional cash
to ￿nance the acquisition and therefore reduces credit market investment by the
same amount. As a result, the interest rate remains constant. E⁄ectively, the
domestic households borrow from the foreign households in order to buy assets
previously owned by these households. Lemma 1 also implies that the interest
rate would not be a⁄ected by changes in domestic or foreign corporate or dividend
tax rates.
3 Tax policy
Our main interest is to investigate the role of residence and source based taxes
in the case of uncoordinated tax policies and the scope for welfare enhancing tax
coordination. In our model, governments levy taxes mainly to ￿nance the provision
of public consumption goods. But taxes also a⁄ect investment behaviour and,
therefore, acquisition prices and the interest rate. Countries may be interested to
change these prices in order to increase national income or to maximize welfare.
10Public expenditure of the domestic country is given by
















The ￿rst term on the right hand side of (14) is revenue from the residence based
tax on interest income, the second term stands for revenue from taxing domestic
￿rms and the third term is revenue raised by the residence based tax on foreign
dividends. The public sector budget constraint of the foreign country is given by
G
￿ = S























The budget constraint of the foreign government di⁄ers from that of the do-
mestic government in that there is no revenue from taxing dividends from ￿rms
located in the domestic country and that the corporate tax partly falls on ￿rms
owned by residents of the domestic country. However, as will be discussed further
below, taxing these ￿rms at source will reduce the prices at which these ￿rms
are acquired, so that the tax burden will ultimately be borne by residents of the
foreign country.
In the following, we start by considering the optimal policy choices with respect
to the source based corporate income tax and then turn to residence based taxes.
The objective of the analysis is to analyse the role of the di⁄erent taxes under
tax competition and to investigate the scope for welfare enhancing tax coordin-
ation. Under tax competition, the domestic government sets its tax instruments
to maximise the welfare of the domestic household, W = u(C1) + C2 + H(G),
and the foreign government maximizes the foreign household￿ s welfare, W ￿ =
u￿(C￿
1) + C￿
2 + H￿(G￿). Each country￿ s government takes as given the tax policy
of the other country. Tax coordination will be discussed further below.
113.1 Source based taxes
We start by considering the source based corporate income tax. The ￿rst order












which implies that the marginal utility of public consumption equals the mar-
ginal utility of private consumption (H0 = 1). The reason is that the domestic tax
a⁄ects neither savings nor M&A investment. The factors driving the corporate tax



























("￿ + ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
(1 + r)(1 ￿ t)
d￿
￿ = 0
The ￿rst term on the right hand side of (17) represents the redistribution of
funds from foreign ￿rms (￿rst term) owned by foreign households to the foreign
government. The second term stands for the welfare e⁄ect of taxing ￿rms owned
by the domestic household. The third term re￿ ects that a higher corporate tax
reduces the acquisition prices received by foreign households who sell their ￿rms
in period 1. Whether or not H￿0 ￿ 1 > 0 holds is ambiguous and depends on the
structure of residence based taxes.5
3.2 Residence based taxes
Governments may levy residence based taxes on the two types of investment income
in our model: dividends from ￿rm ownership and interest income from credit
market investment. The ￿rst order condition for the optimal domestic tax on
5It is straightforward to show that a necessary and su¢ cient condition for H￿0￿1 > 0 to hold
is that the sum of the second and third term of (17) is negative. Using u￿0 = (1 + r)(1 ￿ t￿),
this is given if t￿ + ￿(1 ￿ t￿) < t.
12interest income can be written as
@W
@t
































0. The ￿rst term on the right hand side is negative and re￿ ects that a higher
tax on credit market investment increases the willingness of domestic investors
to pay for the acquisition of foreign ￿rms. This redistributes income from the
domestic economy to the foreign economy. The second term (in square brackets)
represents the impact of the portfolio adjustments triggered by the tax change
on the government budget. The increase in t will induce households to increase
acquisitions and reduce credit market investment (or increase borrowing). Finally,
the last term on the right hand side captures the e⁄ect of an increasing interest
rate (as @r
@t > 0, as shown above) on welfare with
@W
@r
= S + (1 + r)t
@S
@r











1+r . Whether or not the domestic economy bene-
￿ts from an increase in the interest rate depends, among other things, on whether
it imports or exports capital.
How does the foreign country set its tax on interest income? The ￿rst order


























@t￿ = 0. The ￿rst term on the right hand side of (20) stands
for the welfare e⁄ect of shifting funds from the private to the public sector (as
long as H￿0 > 1). The second term describes the impact of tax induced portfolio
restructuring on the government budget. Essentially, fewer ￿rms will be sold to
13investors from the domestic country which implies that credit market investment
declines, so that revenue from the residence based tax on interest income decreases,
too.6 Decreasing foreign acquisitions are associated with an increased foreign rev-
enue from taxing dividends as more ￿rms remain in foreign ownership and with a
decline in corporate tax revenue as long as the the marginal acquisition yields a
positive synergy, i.e. ￿￿c > 0. The e⁄ect of an increase in interest rates on foreign


















Consider next the tax on dividends. The ￿rst order condition for the optimal


























The ￿rst term on the right hand side of (22) is positive and re￿ ects that the
dividend tax reduces the willingness of domestic investors to pay for foreign ￿rms
which reduces their price. The second term re￿ ects the impact of the change in
the household￿ s portfolio structure on the government budget constraint. It turns
out that, at least for t ￿ 0, the optimal domestic dividend tax is unambiguously
positive, despite of H0 = 1. The reason is that the government wants to strategic-
ally reduce acquisition prices and, if t > 0, gains from an increase in credit market
investment.


































The foreign government cannot use its dividend tax to strategically manipulate
6It cannot be excluded that the optimal tax t￿ is negative. In this case, a decline in S would
of course increase tax revenue net of subsidies.
14acquisition prices because acquisition prices are determined by the willingness to
pay of domestic investors and therefore do not depend on ￿
￿, see equation (3).
Thus, the optimal foreign dividend tax will depend on the scarcity of public relative
to private funds (H￿0￿1) and the impact of the portfolio restructurings caused by
a change in this tax on the government budget.
3.3 Coordination of source based taxes
Are tax policies emerging under tax competition optimal for the economy as a
whole? Or is there scope for welfare enhancing tax coordination? At a more
general level, is the need for tax coordination related to source or residence based
taxation? To answer these questions, we start by considering coordination of the
source based corporate income tax holding all other policy variables constant. As
the literature shows (see e.g. Bucovetsky, 1991), coordination experiments in an
asymmetric setting is a complex issue. Fortunately, these complexities can be dealt
with in our framework with regard to source based taxation. Here, our main result
is the following
Proposition 2 i) In the absence of residence based taxes on dividends (￿ = 0),
there is no scope for welfare enhancing coordination of the source based corporate
income tax. Tax competition leads to nationally and globally optimal tax levels.
ii) If dividend taxes are positive (￿ > 0), a coordinated increase in source
based corporate income taxes, departing from the equilibrium without coordination,
decreases welfare.
Proof. We consider a coordinated marginal change in the domestic and the for-
eign corporate tax rates, departing from the equilibrium under tax competition
and holding all other policy instruments (t, t￿, ￿ and ￿
￿) constant. The change
in domestic welfare is dW = @W
@￿ d￿ + @W
@￿￿d￿￿. Since the equilibrium under tax
competition implies @W












15which equals zero for ￿ = 0. Likewise, we can derive the e⁄ect on the welfare
of the foreign country as dW ￿ = @W￿
@￿ d￿ = 0.
The result in proposition 2 may be explained as follows. Given that there is
only M&A investment and credit market investment in our model, international
capital ￿ ows do not involve a relocation of real capital from one country to another.
Moreover, the domestic household is not limited in the number of acquisitions. As
a consequence, the marginal synergy is zero, tax payments under the original owner
and the acquirer are equal and corporate tax rate changes have no impact on M&A
investment. If ￿ > 0, corporate taxes are ine¢ ciently high under tax competition,
i.e. a tax rate cut gives rise to positive ￿scal externalities. This happens because
a cut in the foreign corporate tax rate increase the dividends after foreign taxes.
As a result, domestic tax revenue increases.
It is interesting to contrast the ￿scal externalities arising in our model to the
￿scal externalities arising in models of tax competition with green￿eld investment.
In the case of green￿eld investment, a corporate tax rate cut in one country in-
creases capital demand in that country. Savings available for the creation of new
production facilities become scarcer, so that the interest rate increases. As a res-
ult of this, green￿eld investment in other jurisdictions declines, and savings from
these jurisdictions ￿ ow to the jurisdiction which has reduced its tax rate. If these
jurisdictions levy a source based tax on the marginal green￿eld investment, they
lose tax revenue. Therefore tax rate cuts give rise to negative ￿scal externalities.
However, if they also levy a residence based tax on savings, the increase of the
interest rate caused by the tax cut in the other jurisdiction raises revenue from
the residence based tax on savings. This mitigates the negative ￿scal externality
of corporate tax rate cuts. In so far, residence based taxes on capital income tend
to reduce the need for tax coordination.
3.4 Coordination of residence based taxes
In the previous section, we have shown that tax competition in source based cor-
porate taxes may e⁄ectively lead to e¢ cient outcomes. We did so by showing that
a small increase in ￿ and ￿￿ holding all other policy instruments constant has no
welfare e⁄ect if ￿ = 0 and has negative welfare e⁄ects if ￿ > 0. In the following,
16we analyse an equivalent experiment for t and t￿.













where we used @￿c
@t￿ = 0 and
@P￿(￿￿)
@t￿ = 0. An increase in t￿ reduces the foreign
household￿ s incentive to save and increases the present value of future income
from ￿rm pro￿ts and, thus, the minimum selling price for the marginal target
￿rm. As a consequence, acquisitions are reduced which decreases dividend tax
revenue (￿rst term). Moreover, the interest rate is increased which a⁄ects the
domestic household￿ s welfare according to equation (19). If S < 0, then @W=@r
has an ambiguous sign.
Similarly, an increase in t a⁄ects foreign welfare by
@W ￿
@t




























1￿t . The ￿rst term captures the increase in
intramarginal acquisition prices in response to rising domestic income taxes. The
reason for this e⁄ect is that an increase in t makes saving less attractive than
acquiring ￿rms. This increases demand for target ￿rms. The second term seizes
the change in tax revenue due to an increase in foreign acquisitions, @￿￿c=@t < 0.
Dividend tax revenue is reduced and corporate tax revenue is increased as long as
the marginal synergy ￿￿c is positive. Finally, increasing interest rates (see Lemma)
a⁄ect welfare according to equation (21), which has an ambiguous sign.
Both externalities are ambiguous in sign. As mentioned above, tax coordination
in an asymmetric setting raises some complexities, as has been previously noted in
the tax competition literature, see e.g. Bucovetsky (1991). The main complexity
arising in our model is that a symmetric increase in tax rates, starting from an
asymmetric equilibrium, leads to a change in the relative tax prices of acquisitions,
see equation (5). For instance, increasing t and t￿ by the same amount reduces
the cut-o⁄ level ￿c￿ (increases foreign acquisitions) if t > t￿ and vice versa. This
e⁄ect on the relative tax price makes the coordination e⁄ects dependent on the
17(relative) size of the tax rates in the initial equilibrium. In general, coordination
e⁄ects then become ambiguous. There are two ways of dealing with this issue.
Firstly, we could add a second sector in which foreign households acquire target
￿rms to have a symmetric model with identical equilibrium tax rates. It is straight-
forward to show that our key results remain robust, but the notation becomes
much more cumbersome. Secondly, we may consider asymmetric tax coordination
experiments, i.e. coordinated tax increases which leave the relative tax prices
una⁄ected. In the following, we will pursue this second strategy, mainly to keep
the exposition simple.
Therefore, let both countries increase their tax rates such that the relative
tax price 1￿t
1￿t￿ stays constant which requires dt = 1￿t
1￿t￿dt￿. As a consequence, the
allocation of ownership (i.e. the number of acquisitions in each country) remains
una⁄ected.
How do savings and the interest rate react to such a tax reform? It follows from













u￿00 and dt = 1￿t
1￿t￿dt￿ = d￿ t, it follows dr
d￿ t = 1+r
1￿t. Domestic
saving is a⁄ected by dS
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to show that dS￿
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We summarize this in
Proposition 3 Departing from the uncoordinated equilibrium, a coordinated in-
crease in t and t￿ which leaves the number of acquisitions in each country unaf-
fected, i.e. dt = 1￿t
1￿t￿dt￿, increases welfare if H￿0 ￿ H0 > 0 and S￿ = ￿S > 0.
This proposition shows that a coordinated increase in t and t￿ mainly redis-
tributes funds among the two jurisdictions.
3.5 Tax coordination in taxes on dividends
How do changes in dividend taxes a⁄ect the neighbour countries? Again, we start
with considering the e⁄ect of a small increase in the foreign policy parameter on


























< 0. Increasing ￿
￿ reduces the minimum selling
price of the foreign owners and, thus, increases the number of foreign acquisitions.
This reduces domestic savings (or increases domestic borrowing) and thus decreases
revenue from interest income taxation. In addition, if there is a positive tax rate
on dividends, tax revenue from this source is increased. Note that ￿
￿ has no impact
on the interest rate r.7




























Increasing ￿ reduces the price the domestic investor is willing to pay for the
target ￿rm. As a consequence, all purchase prices are reduced. In addition, rising
dividend taxes reduce the demand for foreign acquisitions and, thus, the need for
foreign savings. This reduces revenue from interest income taxation. Finally, the
decrease in foreign acquisitions increases foreign dividend tax revenue but reduces
corporate tax revenue if the marginal synergy is positive.
Again, both externalities have ambiguous signs. We therefore consider an ex-
periment equivalent to the one in the previous section. Let both countries increase
their dividend tax rates such that the relative dividend tax price 1￿￿
1￿￿￿ stays con-
stant which requires d￿ = 1￿￿
1￿￿￿d￿
￿ = d￿ ￿. Consequently, the number of foreign
acquisitions remains una⁄ected. The e⁄ect on global welfare is given by




























7It is straightforward to show that the externality on domestic welfare is positive if t < ￿.
19We summarize this in
Proposition 4 Departing from the uncoordinated equilibrium, a simultaneous in-
crease of ￿ and ￿
￿ such that the number of foreign acquisitions remains constant,
i.e. d￿ = 1￿￿
1￿￿￿d￿
￿, increases welfare if H￿0 ￿ 1 > 0 and t￿ ￿ t ￿ 0 and, otherwise,
if the tax di⁄erence t ￿ t￿ is su¢ ciently small.
The above three propositions 2 to 4 suggest that, if investment takes the form
of M&A and the number of acquisitions is unlimited, source based taxes are inef-
￿ciently high and residence based taxes are - under mild symmetry requirements
- ine¢ ciently low. In the following, we consider the case in which the number of
acquisitions is limited.
3.6 Extension: Limited number of acquisitions
A crucial assumption for the above analysis is that the number of M&A trans-
actions is not limited. As a consequence, investors acquire target ￿rms until the
marginal after-tax surplus is zero. In the following, we will assume that the num-
ber of acquisitions is constrained to a certain number N. Possible reasons are
scarce management capacities, boundaries to ￿rm size etc. In any way, it captures
the idea that the marginal acquisition yields a positive surplus. At the margin,
investors make a discrete investment choice between the domestic and the foreign
location, which has an equivalent in the analysis of green￿eld investment choices,
see Devereux & Gri¢ th (2003).
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from which follows that source based taxes are no longer neutral. Domestic
corporate taxes increase the number of foreign acquisitions d￿￿c
d￿ = ￿ ￿c
2￿￿￿￿￿ =
￿d￿c








d￿￿ . The e⁄ects
of taxes on interest income and dividends are equivalent to those derived in the
model above.
20Optimal corporate tax policy of the domestic country is given @W
@￿ = 0 and
@W￿
@￿￿ = 0, see the appendix. What are the externalities of corporate taxation in


























An increase in ￿￿ decreases the number of foreign acquisitions and, thus, de-
creases the need for external ￿nance, as @S=@￿￿c = P ￿ (￿￿c) > 0, which increases
the revenue from taxes on interest income. The second term captures the negative
e⁄ect of an increase in ￿￿ on the domestic dividend tax base. Furthermore, the for-
eign corporate tax rate decreases ￿rm income in period 2. However, it also reduces
acquisition prices in period 1 which fully compensates for the income loss in period
2. The third e⁄ect captures the change in tax revenue due to the reallocation of
international acquisitions. The overall e⁄ect is ambiguous.


























An increase in ￿ increases the number of foreign acquisitions which increases
the domestic need for foreign ￿nancial funds, as @S￿=@￿￿c = ￿P ￿ (￿￿c) < 0.
This increases revenue from taxing interest income (￿rst term). Furthermore, it
decreases income from selling ￿rms in period 1 and reduces ￿rm income in period
2. The net e⁄ect can be shown to be strictly positive.8 Finally, the increase in
foreign acquisition reduces foreign dividend tax revenue and increases revenue from
taxing the marginal synergy ￿￿c.
Since the externalities are di⁄erent for both countries, the question arises
whether a coordinated increase of ￿ and ￿￿ increases welfare or reduces it. Due to




(1￿t) ￿c (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) > 0.
21the asymmetry of countries, we consider a coordination experiment similar to those
analysed above. Let both countries increase their corporate tax rate such that the





d￿￿ = d￿ ￿, which
implies that ￿c, ￿￿c, S and S￿ remain constant. Then, world welfare W + W ￿
changes as follows:
d(W + W ￿)
d￿ ￿
= (H









































which is positive as long as asymmetries, measured by t ￿ t￿ and H0 ￿ H￿0,
do not become too severe. Thus, if the number of acquisitions is limited for some
reason, the e⁄ect of coordination is similar to the one in the case of green￿eld
investment.
3.7 Extension: Capital gains taxes and tax depreciation of
goodwill
So far, we have assumed that the proceeds from selling the ￿rm are exempt from
tax and that the acquirer cannot write o⁄ the purchase price. Assume now that
there is a capital gains tax denoted by c, and further that the acquirer gets a
corporate tax deduction ￿ of the purchase price in period 1.9 In this case, the
maximum acquisition price for foreign acquisition would be given by












￿)(1 ￿ ￿) (36)
which is the equivalent to equation (3). The vendor would be indi⁄erent
between selling and not selling if
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￿) (37)
9All other assumptions are as in the base version of the model.
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If the capital gains tax is equal to the corporate income tax rate and the
purchase price is fully deductible, i.e. (1 ￿ ￿￿￿)=(1 ￿ c￿) = 1, the results derived
in the preceding section would be preserved. If there are asymmetries, i.e. if
(1 ￿ ￿￿￿)=(1 ￿ c￿) 6= 1, acquisitions are distorted. However, it is straightforward
to show that our results concerning the need for corporate tax coordination also
hold in this case.
4 Discussion of the results
How are the results derived in the two preceding sections related to the literature on
tax competition and tax coordination? In standard models of tax competition with
green￿eld investment, an increase in source based capital income taxes induces a
capital ￿ ow to other jurisdictions. If these jurisdictions tax the marginal green￿eld
investment, they bene￿t from this capital in￿ ow, i.e. a positive ￿scal externality
arises. Things are di⁄erent if residence and source based taxes coexist. In most
models of green￿eld investment with residence based capital income taxes, the
welfare gains from a coordination of source based taxes are small or even disappear,
see Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991). In the baseline version of our model, quite the
opposite is true. In the absence of residence based taxes, there is no need for
corporate tax coordination, but as soon as residence based taxes exist, a case for
tax coordination can be made. The fact that the bulk of foreign direct investment
is actually M&A suggests that residence based taxes should receive more attention
in international tax coordination initiatives.
As discussed above, a crucial assumption of our results concerns limitations in
the number of acquisitions. As our purpose is to build a model which serves as an
equivalent to the standard model of green￿eld investment, the question arises if
and how the number of investment projects is limited in the standard model. In an
open economy, the number of green￿eld investment projects may have three kinds
of limits, ￿rstly the available amount of saving, secondly the decreasing returns to
23capital in a given location and, thirdly, a limitation in the number of investment
projects per ￿rm. The latter is similar to the one assumed in section 3.6. The
second limit has an equivalent in our model in the decreasing synergy (￿, ￿￿) of
target ￿rms. At the margin, a green￿eld project￿ s return net of the cost of capital is
zero as is an acquisition￿ s after-tax synergy. A crucial di⁄erence occurs at the ￿rst
limit which does not hold for acquisitions. Whereas green￿eld investment absorbs
savings, acquisitions just redistribute savings. Capital invested in a green￿eld
project cannot be used elsewhere whereas the proceeds from selling the ￿rm may
be invested at the world capital market. In the light of these arguments, we
would like to propose that the baseline version of our model may be considered as
an equivalent to the standard model of green￿eld investment where the marginal
return just covers the cost of capital, whereas the model analysed in section 3.6
may serve as an equivalent to the green￿eld model of discrete investment choices,
as in Devereux and Gri¢ th (2003).
It is also interesting to discuss our results in the light of the view developed in
Desai and Hines (2004) who argue that, since M&A investment abroad does not
reduce the domestic capital stock, a tax policy which is based on this assumption
is necessarily misguided. As a consequence, governments should exempt foreign
income from tax because an additional tax upon repatriation distorts ownership
decision and leads to e¢ ciency losses. Our analysis con￿rms that taking into
account M&A investment changes the implications for tax policy substantially.
However, we also show that di⁄erences in residence based do not need to distort
ownership decisions, see equation (3).
Our results are also related to the literature on the capitalization of taxes
in land prices (see Mieszkowski, 1972, or Hamilton, 1976). Source based taxes
are neutral for the number of acquisitions because any tax change will be fully
capitalized in acquisition prices. This happens because target ￿rms are immobile
by assumption and therefore cannot escape taxation by relocating abroad. The
comparison with the literature on land prices also points to a limitation of our
analysis: We do not discuss the initial investment decisions that created the target
￿rms. Adding this decision would introduce elements of green￿eld investment into
the model. The key tax e⁄ects related to mergers and acquisitions derived in our
model would remain, but they would come out much less clearly.
245 Conclusions
This paper develops a framework designed to analyse the role of source and res-
idence based taxes for tax competition and tax coordination in a world where
investment takes the form of M&A investment rather than green￿eld investment.
In the base version of our model, domestic entrepreneurs acquire domestic and
foreign ￿rms to exploit synergies. An acquisition does not imply a change in the
stock of a ￿rm￿ s real capital, just a change in ownership. The governments levy
source based taxes on corporate pro￿ts and residence based taxes on dividends
and interest income. If the number of potential acquisitions is unlimited, source
based taxes do not a⁄ect M&A investment. One reason is that M&A investment
does not absorb savings, in contrast to green￿eld investment.
We ￿nd that, if governments can only levy source based taxes, the tax levels
they choose under tax competition are also e¢ cient for the economy as a whole,
which implies that there is no room for welfare enhancing tax coordination. The
reason is that a change in the source based tax in one country does not a⁄ect M&A
investment in other countries, i.e. no ￿scal externalities arise. In contrast, if there
are residence based taxes, competition in source based taxes gives rise to negative
￿scal externalities which imply ine¢ ciently high tax rates in equilibrium.
These results contrast with ￿ndings for tax competition for green￿eld invest-
ment, where source based taxes are usually seen as the major source of ￿scal
externalities. The availability of residence based taxes makes the demand for tax
coordination less pressing or even implies that no coordination of source based
taxes is necessary any more (Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1991).
If the number of acquisitions is limited for some reason, the implications for
tax policy are similar to the case of green￿eld investment. Higher source based
taxes will give rise to positive ￿scal externalities and ine¢ ciently low tax levels are
likely to prevail under tax competition.
In terms of policy implications, our results imply that the prevailing view, ac-
cording to which tax competition leads to ine¢ ciently low levels of source based
taxes, has to be quali￿ed. More attention may have to be devoted to the interac-
tion between source and residence based taxes and the impact of taxes on M&A
investment.
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27Appendix
The ￿rst order conditions for optimal tax policy choices in section 3.6 are given by
@W
@￿
= 0 = (H














































































These two equations are used to derive equation (35).
28CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2793 Vidar Christiansen and Stephen Smith, Externality-correcting Taxes and Regulation, 
September 2009 
 
2794 John Beirne, Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Marianne Schulze-Ghattas and Nicola 
Spagnolo, Global and Regional Spillovers in Emerging Stock Markets: A Multivariate 
GARCH-in-mean Analysis, September 2009 
 
2795 Rüdiger Pethig and Frieder Kolleß, Asymmetric Capital-Tax Competition, 
Unemployment and Losses from Capital Market Integration, September 2009 
 
2796 Ngo Van Long, Horst Raff and Frank Stähler, Innovation and Trade with 
Heterogeneous Firms, September 2009 
 
2797 Margit Osterloh and Bruno S. Frey, Research Governance in Academia: Are there 
Alternatives to Academic Rankings?, September 2009 
 
2798 Thiess Buettner and Clemens Fuest, The Role of the Corporate Income Tax as an 
Automatic Stabilizer, September 2009 
 
2799 Annette Alstadsæter, Measuring the Consumption Value of Higher Education, 
September 2009 
 
2800 Peter Friedrich, Chang Woon Nam and Janno Reiljan, Local Fiscal Equalization in 
Estonia: Is a Reform Necessary?, September 2009 
 
2801 Evžen Kočenda and Jan Hanousek, State Ownership and Control in the Czech Republic, 
September 2009 
 
2802 Michael Stimmelmayr, Wage Inequality in Germany: Disentangling Demand and 
Supply Effects, September 2009 
 
2803 Biswa N. Bhattacharyay, Towards a Macroprudential Surveillance and Remedial Policy 
Formulation System for Monitoring Financial Crisis, September 2009 
 
2804 Margarita Katsimi, Sarantis Kalyvitis and Thomas Moutos, “Unwarranted” Wage 
Changes and the Return on Capital, September 2009 
 
2805 Christian Lessmann and Gunther Markwardt, Aid, Growth and Devolution, September 
2009 
 
2806 Bas Jacobs and Dirk Schindler, On the Desirability of Taxing Capital Income to Reduce 
Moral Hazard in Social Insurance, September 2009 
 
2807 Hans Gersbach and Noemi Hummel, Climate Policy and Development, September 2009 
  
2808 David E. Wildasin, Fiscal Competition for Imperfectly-Mobile Labor and Capital: A 
Comparative Dynamic Analysis, September 2009 
 
2809 Johan Eyckmans and Cathrine Hagem, The European Union’s Potential for Strategic 
Emissions Trading through Minimal Permit Sale Contracts, September 2009 
 
2810 Ruediger Bachmann and Christian Bayer, The Cross-section of Firms over the Business 
Cycle: New Facts and a DSGE Exploration, October 2009 
 
2811 Slobodan Djajić and Michael S. Michael, Temporary Migration Policies and Welfare of 
the Host and Source Countries: A Game-Theoretic Approach, October 2009 
 
2812 Devis Geron, Social Security Incidence under Uncertainty Assessing Italian Reforms, 
October 2009 
 
2813 Max-Stephan Schulze and Nikolaus Wolf, Economic Nationalism and Economic 
Integration: The Austro-Hungarian Empire in the Late Nineteenth Century, October 
2009 
 
2814 Emilia Simeonova, Out of Sight, Out of Mind? The Impact of Natural Disasters on 
Pregnancy Outcomes, October 2009 
 
2815 Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson, Non-Partisan ‘Get-Out-the-Vote’ Efforts and 
Policy Outcomes, October 2009 
 
2816 Sascha O. Becker, Erik Hornung and Ludger Woessmann, Catch Me If You Can: 
Education and Catch-up in the Industrial Revolution, October 2009 
 
2817 Horst Raff and Nicolas Schmitt, Imports, Pass-Through, and the Structure of Retail 
Markets, October 2009 
 
2818 Paul De Grauwe and Daniel Gros, A New Two-Pillar Strategy for the ECB, October 
2009 
 
2819 Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Thouraya Hadj Amor and Christophe Rault, International 
Financial Integration and Real Exchange Rate Long-Run Dynamics in Emerging 
Countries: Some Panel Evidence, October 2009 
 
2820 Saša Žiković and Randall K. Filer, Hybrid Historical Simulation VaR and ES: 
Performance in Developed and Emerging Markets, October 2009 
 
2821 Panu Poutvaara and Andreas Wagener, The Political Economy of Conscription, October 
2009 
 
2822 Steinar Holden and Åsa Rosén, Discrimination and Employment Protection, October 
2009 
 
2823 David G. Mayes, Banking Crisis Resolution Policy – Lessons from Recent Experience – 
Which elements are needed for robust and efficient crisis resolution?, October 2009 
  
2824 Christoph A. Schaltegger, Frank Somogyi and Jan-Egbert Sturm, Tax Competition and 
Income Sorting: Evidence from the Zurich Metropolitan Area, October 2009 
 
2825 Natasa Bilkic, Thomas Gries and Margarethe Pilichowski, Stay in School or Start 
Working? – The Human Capital Investment Decision under Uncertainty and 
Irreversibility, October 2009 
 
2826 Hartmut Egger and Udo Kreickemeier, Worker-Specific Effects of Globalisation, 
October 2009 
 
2827 Alexander Fink and Thomas Stratmann, Institutionalized Bailouts and Fiscal Policy: 
The Consequences of Soft Budget Constraints, October 2009 
 
2828 Wolfgang Ochel and Anja Rohwer, Reduction of Employment Protection in Europe: A 
Comparative Fuzzy-Set Analysis, October 2009 
 
2829 Rainald Borck and Martin Wimbersky, Political Economics of Higher Education 
Finance, October 2009 
 
2830 Torfinn Harding and Frederick van der Ploeg, Is Norway’s Bird-in-Hand Stabilization 
Fund Prudent Enough? Fiscal Reactions to Hydrocarbon Windfalls and Graying 
Populations, October 2009 
 
2831 Klaus Wälde, Production Technologies in Stochastic Continuous Time Models, October 
2009 
 
2832 Biswa Bhattacharyay, Dennis Dlugosch, Benedikt Kolb, Kajal Lahiri, Irshat 
Mukhametov and Gernot Nerb, Early Warning System for Economic and Financial 
Risks in Kazakhstan, October 2009 
 
2833 Jean-Claude Trichet, The ECB’s Enhanced Credit Support, October 2009 
 
2834 Hans Gersbach, Campaigns, Political Mobility, and Communication, October 2009 
 
2835 Ansgar Belke, Gunther Schnabl and Holger Zemanek, Real Convergence, Capital 
Flows, and Competitiveness in Central and Eastern Europe, October 2009 
 
2836 Bruno S. Frey, Simon Luechinger and Alois Stutzer, The Life Satisfaction Approach to 
Environmental Valuation, October 2009 
 
2837 Christoph Böhringer and Knut Einar Rosendahl, Green Serves the Dirtiest: On the 
Interaction between Black and Green Quotas, October 2009 
 
2838 Katarina Keller, Panu Poutvaara and Andreas Wagener, Does Military Draft Discourage 
Enrollment in Higher Education? Evidence from OECD Countries, October 2009 
 
2839 Giovanni Cespa and Xavier Vives, Dynamic Trading and Asset Prices: Keynes vs. 
Hayek, October 2009 
 
  
2840 Jan Boone and Jan C. van Ours, Why is there a Spike in the Job Finding Rate at Benefit 
Exhaustion?, October 2009 
 
2841 Andreas Knabe, Steffen Rätzel and Stephan L. Thomsen, Right-Wing Extremism and 
the Well-Being of Immigrants, October 2009 
 
2842 Andrea Weber and Christine Zulehner, Competition and Gender Prejudice: Are 
Discriminatory Employers Doomed to Fail?, November 2009 
 
2843 Hadi Salehi Esfahani, Kamiar Mohaddes and M. Hashem Pesaran, Oil Exports and the 
Iranian Economy, November 2009 
 
2844 Ruediger Bachmann and Christian Bayer, Firm-Specific Productivity Risk over the 
Business Cycle: Facts and Aggregate Implications, November 2009 
 
2845 Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Burcu Erdogan and Vladimir Kuzin, Testing for 
Convergence in Stock Markets: A Non-Linear Factor Approach, November 2009 
 
2846 Michèle Belot and Jan Fidrmuc, Anthropometry of Love – Height and Gender 
Asymmetries in Interethnic Marriages, November 2009 
 
2847 Volker Nitsch and Nikolaus Wolf, Tear Down this Wall: On the Persistence of Borders 
in Trade, November 2009 
 
2848 Jan K. Brueckner and Stef Proost, Carve-Outs Under Airline Antitrust Immunity, 
November 2009 
 
2849 Margarita Katsimi and Vassilis Sarantides, The Impact of Fiscal Policy on Profits, 
November 2009 
 
2850 Scott Alan Carson, The Relationship between Stature and Insolation: Evidence from 
Soldiers and Prisoners, November 2009 
 
2851 Horst Raff and Joachim Wagner, Intra-Industry Adjustment to Import Competition: 
Theory and Application to the German Clothing Industry, November 2009 
 
2852 Erkki Koskela, Impacts of Labor Taxation with Perfectly and Imperfectly Competitive 
Labor Markets under Flexible Outsourcing, November 2009 
 
2853 Cletus C. Coughlin and Dennis Novy, Is the International Border Effect Larger than the 
Domestic Border Effect? Evidence from U.S. Trade, November 2009 
 
2854 Johannes Becker and Clemens Fuest, Source versus Residence Based Taxation with 
International Mergers and Acquisitions, November 2009 